Retrenchment and the Law by Madhuku, Lovemore
Zimbabwe Law
Renew




Retrenchment and the Law .
Lovemore M adhuku
Criminal Justice and the Truth in Zimbabwe: A Necessary Introspection?........... 18
Charles G oredema
Women, Land and the Constitution.................
J. E. S tewart i w i i i ;
...... 42
Judges in the Storm: The Judicial Review Debate...................................................... 50
M unyaradzi G wisai
Electoral Law in Zimbabwe........................................................................................... 64
L ovemore M adhuku
The Judiciary and Democratic Governance in Sub-saharan Africa:
The Complexities of Regulating Competing Interests.............................................. 91
S ufian H emed B ukurura
An Appraisal of the Recommendations of the Law Development
Commission on Misrepresentation in Insurance Law ............................... ..............103
M ichele M enezes
Amendment of an Indictment: When is it Proper Under Botswana L aw ?........... 114
K abelo K enneth L ebotse
Towards a Compensatory Approach to Redressing Constitutional 
Violations in Botswana............................................................................................ |.... 120
D uma G ideon B oko
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Class War in The Courts? Retrenchment Packages and Continental
Fashions (Pvt) Ltd. v. Mupfuriri and Others.................................................................  134
M unyaradzi G wisai
Municipal Law: The Law Regulating Conditions of Service for
Junior Local Government Employees........................................................................ 144
Arthur M anase
U.Z. Library
Z imbabwe L aw Review 1
RETRENCHMENT AND THE LAW
Lovemore Madhuku
Lecturer in Law, Department of Public Law, University of Zimbabwe
INTRODUCTION
Retrenchments belong to the class of termination of employment commonly described as 
"economic dismissals". This class is distinct in that on the one hand workers lose their jobs 
without any fault (such as misconduct) or other reason (such as through the operation of 
the contract of employment) attributable to them, while on the other, the employer may be 
compelled by unavoidable economic considerations to terminate the services of some 
workers. Rycroft and Jordan have expressed this distinctiveness in the following words:
Workforce reduction or retrenchment, because of recession, technological change, 
unionisation, disinvestment, transfer of the business or decentralisation has become a 
major issue of law and social policy. For the retrenched worker at a time of rising 
unemployment, the loss of a job frequently means "disappearance into the large mass 
of the unemployed". For the employer at a time of recession, to retrench is often the 
only way to ensure economic survival.1
It is also important to emphasize that while a retrenchment is merely one of the forms of 
termination of employment, its social, economic and political ramifications tend to be of a 
greater scale than other forms of termination of employment. Accordingly, it is not surprising 
that many countries have specific and som etim es elaborate legal provisions on 
retrenchment.
RATIONALE OF RETRENCHMENT LAW
A question which arises at the outset is: what are the objectives of the law in this area? This 
is a controversial issue given the irreconcilable interests of workers and the employer. The 
employer has the traditional claim to managerial prerogatives in determining the size and 
character of the workforce.2 In Lesney Products Co Ltd v Nolatt3 Lord Denning underscored 
managerial prerogatives as follows:
It is important that nothing should be done to impair the ability of employers to 
reorganise their workforce and their terms and conditions of work so as to improve 
efficiency.
On the other hand, "there is a growing refusal by workers to accept that retrenchment is 
the inevitable consequence of economic forces or technological change over which they 
have no control. Workers have come to expect procedural and substantive safeguards against 
retrenchment".4
1. Rycroft and Jordan, A Guide to South African Labour Law, 2nd edition 1992, p. 230.
2. See Simon Deakin and Gillian Morris, Labour Law (1995), p. 446.
3. [1974] ICR 170 [CA].
4. See Rycroft and Jordan, op.cit, p.230.
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It has been said that the purpose of retrenchment law is to "ensure that economic dismissals 
never occur, or at least make it economically inadvisable for employers as long as the 
business remains solvent".5 A number of justifications have been given for such a purpose 
of the law. The chief one is that an employee has a property right in his or her job. It was 
explained in an English case in this way:
Just as a property owner has a right in his property and when he is deprived, he is 
entitled to compensation, so a long-term employee is considered to have a right of 
property in his job, he has a right to security and his rights gain in value with the 
years.6
Another justification is of distributive justice. The employer benefits by improved 
productivity after reducing labour costs through retrenchment. It is then argued that those 
workers who have "sacrificed their jobs should partake of some of the benefits to general 
welfare derived from superior productivity" .7
It appears, however that retrenchment law is not designed to prevent employers from 
retrenching but is mainly premised upon the need to strike a balance between the competing 
interests of employers and workers with a view to (i) preventing an unwarranted resort to 
retrenchment, (ii) cushioning workers from the economic effects of losing a job through 
compensation, and (iii) encouraging workers to accept retrenchmen: in desirable 
circumstances.8
The lack of certainty over what retrenchment law is designed to achieve h<s led to some 
questionable decisions by Zimbabwean courts. In Continental Fashions (Pvt) Ltd v Mupfuriri 
and Ors,9 the Supreme Court failed to grasp the clear difference between the objectives of 
retrenchment as an economic concept and the objects of retrenchment law. In hat case, the 
Supreme Court held that where retrenchment is aimed at avoiding liquidation, the ability 
of the company to pay a proposed retrenchment package is the ultimate criterion in 
determining whether or not that package is reasonable. While it may be true tfiat where 
retrenchment is designed to "avoid the collapse and liquidation of the company," ihe ability 
of the company to pay is an important factor, it does not follow that this is the ultimate 
consideration because retrenchment law has a different compass, namely striking abalance 
between the two competing interests of the employer and the employee.
However, some cases have shown a commendable grasp of the rationale of retrenchment 
law. In Chidziim v ZISCO,w Muchechetere JA noted:
It should be borne in mind the clear and broad intention of the said Regulations was 
to prevent unnecessary and wholesale retrenchments of employees by employers.
And where retrenchment had been justified to ensure that this had to be done in a fair 
and transparent manner taking into account all the personal circumstances of the 
persons to be affected. In the case where a large number of employees, such as in the
5. Referred to in Hugh Collins, Justice in Dismissals p. 144.
6. See Wynes v Sonthrepps Hall Broiler Farm Ltd [1968] ITR 407.
7. Hugh Collins, op.cit. p 157.
8. See generally. Hugh Collins, op.cit; John Bowers and Simon Honeyball, Textbook on Labour Law, 2nd 
edition, Blackstone Press Limited, p.184-186.
9. 1997 (2) ZLR 405 (S).
10. Supra.
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present case, was to be retrenched there is greater need for the strict compliance with 
the said Regulations because the lives of many people who had spent most of their 
working lives with the respondent was at stake.11
HISTORY AND SOURCES OF RETRENCHMENT LAW IN ZIMBABWE
The common law knows no retrenchment. Termination of employment on notice is 
acceptable under the common law, whether the reason be economic considerations or 
otherwise. Retrenchment is therefore a matter of labour legislation. The Master and Servants 
Act12 which governed individual employment law in Zimbabwe from 1901 to 1980 did not 
have any provision on retrenchment. It was repealed by the Employment Act,13 but this 
latter Act also had no provision on retrenchment and the common law continued to apply. 
However, the 1980 Minimum Wages Act14 specifically prohibited any employer from 
terminating the services of an employee "solely on the ground of a requirement to pay him 
a minimum wage".15 This effectively outlawed any retrenchment on the sole basis of failure 
to pay a minimum wage and this may be taken as the first inroad into the wide ambit 
given by the common law over dism issals on notice. A more direct regulation of 
retrenchment had to wait for the enactment of the Labour Relations Art (chapter ?a-m) 16 
The Act itself does not contain any provisions on retrenchment but empowers the Minister 
to make regulations on a variety of matters, including retrenchment.17 The first regulations 
made by the Minister which covered retrenchment were the Labour Relations (General 
Conditions of Employment) (Termination of Employment) Regulations.18 Section 4(1) of 
the regulations simply provided:
No employer shall — (a) impose work on a short-time basis on; or (b) lay-off or retrench, 
any employee or group or class of employees without the prior written approval of 
the Minister.
Except for the further requirement that the Minister had to consult the appropriate trade 
union and the employers' organisation before granting the approval to retrench,19 the 
regulations had no other details such as the procedure to be followed, any notice period 
before retrenchment and retrenchment packages payable. All such aspects were presumably 
left to the Minister. With the advent of the economic structural adjustment programme in 
1990 and in the face of more widespread retrenchments, the above provisions were repealed 
by SI 400 of 1990 and more detailed regulations were gazetted on the same day as the 
repeal.20 The regulations have been amended only twice and remain the main source of the
11. At p380D.
12. Act No. 4 of 1980.
13. Act No. 13 of 1980.
14. Act No. 4 of 1980.
15. Section 7 (1) of the Act.
16. Promulgated as Act. No. 16 Of 1985.
17. See section 17 (3) of the Act.
18. SI 371/85.
19. Section 4(3).
20. The regulations are the Labour Relations (Retrenchment) Regulations, 1990: SI 404 of 1990 which 
were gazetted on 21 December 1990.
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law on retrenchment in Zimbabwe.21 A substantial body of case law is developing on 
retrenchment.
WHAT IS RETRENCHMENT?
The regulations define "retrench" as follows: "in relation to an employee, means to terminate 
the employee's employment for the purpose of reducing expenditure or costs, adapting to 
technological change, closing down or reorganising the undertaking in which the employee 
is or was employed, or for similar reasons".22
Although this definition has been in the regulations since 1990, it is shocking to read McNally 
JA in Continental Fashions (Pvt) Ltd v Mupfuriri 23saying:
Retrenchment, when used in the context of labour relations, means a cutting back of 
expenditure on the employment of workers by reducing their number. (The definition 
is mine. There is none in the Regulations).24
The definition of "retrench" in the regulations shows that retrenchment in our context 
covers m ost conceivable form s of economic d ism issals — d ism issa ls involving 
reorganisation, closing down, technological changes and saving costs. What makes a 
dismissal a "retrenchment" is the reason for it. If the reason for a dismissal is one of those 
specified in the definition, that dism issal is a retrenchment within the scope of the 
regulations. It would appear that the purpose of "reducing expenditure" covered by the 
definition means that an employer may retrench simply to increase profits.25 26Obviously, it 
should be permissible for a court to go behind the purported reasons given by an employer 
if there is a basis to suspect that some other reasons are being given in order to circumvent 
retrenchment law. An attempt was made in the South African case of Hlongwane and another 
v Plastix (Pty) Ltd26 to distinguish between "retrenchment" and "redundancy" with the 
former being a dismissal on the basis that the employee has become superfluous due to an 
economic downturn and the latter covering dismissals due to technological changes or 
reorganisation.27 This distinction is not helpful. In Zimbabwe, the definition is wide enough 
to cover both situations.
It is not clear whether termination for purposes of a sale or transfer of business can be 
characterised as a retrenchment under the regulations. Under the common law, a purchaser 
of a business is under no obligation to continue with employment contracts of the existing 
employees, save that the employee can sue the old employer for constructive dismissal, 
the sale of the business being taken as repudiatory breach of the contract of employment.28 
Section 16 of the Labour Relations Act alters this common law position by deeming the 
contracts of employment to be transferred to the purchaser on terms and conditions which
21. The amendments were effected by SI 252/90 (Amendment No.l)and SI 137/94 (Amendment No. 2).
22. See section 2 of the Regulations.
23. Supra.
24. See page 407 E.
25. See Food and Allied Workers Union & Others v Kellogg SA (Pty) Ltd (1993) 14ILJ 406 at 413A.
26. (1990) 11 ILJ 171 (IC).
27. See the reference to the case in John Grogan, Workplace Law (3rd edition, 1998), p.159.
28. See Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries [1940] 3 All ER 549 (HL).
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are not less favourable than those applicable to the employees at the time of the sale or 
transfer. It is submitted that section 16 does not affect the question of whether or not a 
termination of employment to facilitate a sale or transfer of business is a retrenchment. It 
may be a retrenchment on the basis of either being a "closing down" within the 
contemplation of the regulations or as being "similar" to a closing down. If the new owner 
decides to terminate the services of the employees whom he / she has inherited for purposes 
of reorganisation, that is still retrenchment regardless of the length of time the employees 
have served the new owner,
RETRENCHMENT PROCEDURE
The main effect of the retrenchment regulations is to impose a mandatory procedure for 
the retrenchment process. Section 9 of the regulations makes it clear that no employer shall 
retrench any employee outside the approval process in the regulations. The Supreme Court 
has held, emphatically, that any purported retrenchment not in compliance with the 
regulations is null and void.29 In Chidziva and Ors v Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Co Ltd,30 
Muchechetere JA expressed this as follows:
In the circumstances, I agree with the submission that the retrenchment exercise was 
improper. It was carried out in contravention of the provisions of the said Regulations.
It was therefore illegal and void.31
The effect of the retrenchment being null and void is that the employees are regarded as 
still being employed with the consequent obligation of the employer to pay them wages.32 
Section 10 of the Regulations makes this position beyond doubt by declaring: "For the 
avoidance of doubt, it is declared that any purported retrenchment of an employee which is carried 
out otherwise than in accordance with an approval granted in terms of these regulations, shall be of 
no effect whatsoever."
An employer who realizes that the retrenchment was unlawful, may reinstate the employees 
with full pay and benefits and re-institute fresh retrenchment proceedings.
The process involved in retrenchment is as follows:
1. An employer wishing to retrench must first give written notice of the intention to retrench 
to either the works council or where there is no works council, to the employment council.33 
However, even where a works council exists, if the majority of the employees being proposed 
for retrenchment agree, the notice may be given to the employment council instead of the 
works council.34 In The Late K.C Matema & Others v Zimoco35 it was established that at the 
meeting of the works council that approved retrenchments, there had been more workers 
committee members than representatives of management. The workers sought to have
29. See Kadir and Sons (Pvt) Ltd v Panganai and Anor 1996 (1) 598 (S); Chidziva and Ors v Zimbabwe Iron and 
Steel Co Ltd. 1997 (2) ZLR 368 (S).
30. Supm.
31. At p.378B.
32. See generally Kadir and Sons (Pvt) Ltd v Panganai and Anor 1996 (1) ZLR 598(S) at 604.
33. Section 3 (1) of the Regulations.
34. Section 3 (1) (a) (ii).
35. SC 118/99,.
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retrenchment set aside on the basis that the works council was improperly constituted. 
This was rejected by the Supreme Court as follows:-
. . . the stipulation in the regulations that there should be equality of employer and 
employee representatives is a provision purely for the benefit of employees. 
Accordingly, it can never have been the intention of the legislature that it could lie in 
the mouth of one of the two sets of protagonists to complain that the other protagonist 
was under-represented. . .  it is such a glaring absurdity that it could never have been 
intended. In the circumstances the fact that the workers representatives were more 
than those of the employers did not constitute a breach of the regulations.36
In the unlikely situation that there is neither a works council nor an employment council 
for the undertaking concerned, the written notice must be given to the retrenchment 
committee set up in terms of section 4 of the regulations.37 The written notice is required to 
give details of the reasons for the retrenchment and the employees being proposed for 
retrenchment. It is mandatory that the notice contains the names of the proposed employees 
and the employer cannot withhold the names even where he/she strongly feels that the 
release of the names might be premature or sensitive.38 The rationale for this appears to be 
to enable the workers concerned to consult or seek advice or even seek alternative 
employment given that the selection of employees for retrenchment may itself be subject 
to bargaining. There is no minimum notice period specified in the regulations, but it has 
been held that what is required is a reasonable period of notice to enable the works council 
or other authority, as the case may be, to have meaningful deliberations on the matter.39
The sending of the notice has no legal effect on the employment contracts of the employees 
concerned. They remain employees until the retrenchment has been approved. Gubbay CJ 
made this point clear in Kadir and Sons (Pvt) Ltd v Panganai as follows:
It is clear to me that until the critical stage of the Minister's decision has been reached, 
the employees whom the employer proposes to retrench remain on the pay-roll. They 
have not been retrenched. The fact that in the interim period the employer may have 
ceased to operate the business does not rid him of the legal obligation to pay the 
employees their wages. That this is so is underscored by the use of the phrase "proposed 
retrenchment" in ss 5, 6 and 7 of the Regulations.40
2. On receipt of the notice from the employer, the authority in question (works council or 
employment council or retrenchment committee or person authorised by the retrenchment 
committee41 as the case may be) is required, within a maximum period of one month, to 
"attempt to secure agreement between the employer and employees concerned, or their 
representatives, as to whether or not the employees should be retrenched and, if they are 
to be retrenched, the terms and conditions on which they may be retrenched". The role of 
the works council has been the subject of recent cases. The works council is defined as "a
36. at. p4-5.
37. See proviso to section 3(1).
38. See Chidziva v ZISCO (supra).
39. See Kadir and Sons (Pvt) Ltd v Panganai and Anm. 1996 (1) ZLR 598 (S).
40. See page 604C.
41. As already noted, in cases where there is neither a works council nor employment council, notice is 
sent to the retrenchment committee. However, the retrenchment committee is entitled to authorise 
some other person to act as an authority.
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council composed of an equal number of representatives of an employer and representatives 
drawn from members of a workers committee".42
Given the fact that both the works council and the employment council are composed of 
equal numbers of workers and employer representatives, does the role of these entities end 
with merely acting as mediators and leaving the agreement to be struck between the 
employer and the employees concerned or should agreements within works councils or 
employment councils themselves not be sufficient? Put differently, once a notice to retrench 
has be received by the authority (works council or employment council), is it not competent 
for the authority to rely on its bipartite membership to bargain over and, where possible, 
reach agreement on the retrenchment?
These aspects were addressed by Muchechetere JA in Chidziva v ZISCO,43 He held that the 
regulations referred to three parties: the authority, the employer and employees concerned 
or their representatives. It followed that the authority (works council or employment council) 
is independent with the sole role of being a mediator or facilitator and an agreement of its 
members cannot be taken to be an agreement of the employer and employees concerned. 
More fundamentally, workers on the works council are not to be regarded as representing 
the interests of workers to be retrenched. He made the point in the following words:
I am of the view that worker's representatives on the works council had neither the 
statutory authority nor the mandate to represent the workers who were facing 
retrenchment. As I have already indicated above, they were appointed on the works 
council as representatives of all the workers but once appointed they became part of 
the council and separate from the workers.44
Muchechetere JA was not breaking new ground. The same views had been expressed by 
Bartlett J in Barry Thomas Prosser and 35 others v ZISCO45 where he noted:
The works council effectively in terms of section 3(2) was supposed to act in some 
respects as a m ediator between the em ployer and the em ployees (or their 
representatives) to try and decide whether there should be retrenchment and if so on 
what terms and conditions. It accordingly would not be possible for the managerial 
members of the works council to wear two-hats one as members of the works council 
trying to secure an agreement and the other as the representatives of the persons about 
to be retrenched.46
This interpretation of the retrenchment regulations demolishes a common practice in 
industry, namely the use of the works council itself as the negotiating forum whereby the 
agreement of members of the council is taken to be the agreement between the employer 
and employees to be retrenched. It is submitted that while the interpretation is attractive 
from a technical and literal reading of the regulations, it is ultimately unsound in principle. 
The features which support the interpretation are (i) the express words of the regulations 
which specify the duty of the authority to be "to secure agreement between the employer
42. See section 2 of the Labour Relations (workers committees) (General) Regulations, 1985; SI372/1985. 
See also section 2 of the Labour Relations Act (chapter 28:01).
43. Supra.
44. At p. 376G.
45. HH 201/93.
46. At p 7-8 of cyclostyled judgement.
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and employees concerned"47 and (ii) the emphasis by the regulations on the concept of the 
"employees concerned", suggesting that they have to be treated as a distinct entity. An 
example of the latter emphasis is in section 3 (1) (a) (ii) where it is only a "majority of the 
employees concerned" who can decide that the written notice of retrenchment be sent to 
an employment council instead of a works council.
The retrenchment regulations appear to be a victim of poor drafting and unclear policy 
articulation. The situation is worsened by a Supreme Court which interprets labour statutes 
without due regard to the practice which has shaped key institutions of the labour market. 
The structure of the works council follows that of an employment council, where the equal 
numbers of employer and employee representatives is designed to make the institution a 
bargaining chamber. The basic philosophy is that of "representative democracy" where 
each party consults its constituency before and during the negotiations until an agreement 
acceptable to both parties is struck. As a matter of principle, an agreement of members of 
the works council or employment council, arrived at after constant consultations during 
the period of negotiations should translate into an agreement of the employer and employees 
concerned. Indeed, this is how the collective bargaining process has been regulated in this 
country since 1934.48 To use such a structure merely for mediation is both nonsensical and 
unrealistic. It is nonsensical because one does not need a bipartite body for mediation: in 
mediation, the parties are not bound by the advice of the mediator. It is unrealistic because 
it is difficult to imagine how the mediation should proceed: are the workers on the works 
council expected to persuade the employer? Or is the works council itself expected to debate 
the proposals, arrive at some agreed position and then use that position as a guide to its 
mediation role?
More fundamentally, to use the works council as a mediator leads to a glaring absurdity in 
one critical respect. Whereas it is possible to separate worker representatives on the works 
council from the employees proposed for retrenchment, it is absurd to separate "employer 
representatives" on the works council from the employer. Employer representatives on 
the works council are almost invariably the managers or directors who represent the 
employer in or outside the works council so that there is no employer outside the works 
council with whom a mediation can happen. This absurdity, it is submitted, is so glaring 
that it could never have been intended. Further, the use of the works council or employment 
council merely as a mediator means that the workers committee or trade union, as the case 
may be, is disempowered and this may have serious implications for worker organisations. 
According to the interpretation, employees proposed for retrenchment have no access to 
assistance by the workers committee whose members are by definition, the only persons 
who qualify to be members of the works council. This may require the creation of an 
alternative worker leadership for purposes of retrenchment disputes because the approach 
in Chidziva makes the workers committee virtually impotent in retrenchment disputes. It 
is doubtful whether such a result could have been intended in a labour environment where 
the workers committee is expected to be the main representative of workers, hence the 
insistence by law that the only workers who qualify to be members of the works council
47. See section 3 (2) of the Regulations.
48. See Industrial Conciliation Act, 1934 (Act No. 10 of 1934).
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are members of the workers committee. More fundamentally, the view that worker 
representatives on the works council do not represent employees is contrary to the clear 
position in section 24(1) (d) of the Act where it is stated that a workers committee shall 
"elect some of its members to represent employees on the works council".
The better approach is to hold that the role of the works council is to be a bargaining 
chamber, with the representatives of both parties being empowered, after consulting their 
respective "constituencies", to agree on whether or not there should be retrenchment and 
if so, on what terms. There is support for this approach in the regulations. First, section 
(2a) compels the authority to "secure agreement" on a variety of matters such as restricting 
overtime, job-sharing or the reduction of working hours, and where retrenchment is 
unavoidable, the phasing of retrenchments over a period of time and the criteria for selecting 
employees. It is difficult to "secure agreement" on any of these matters in a role of mediation. 
Secondly, section 7 has the following expression:
In deciding whether or not to approve the retrenchment of employees . . .
This is only consistent with a role for the works council being more than just mere mediation. 
Yet it can easily be read to imply that the works council is a bargaining chamber where an 
agreement of the members thereof becomes an "approval" of the retrenchment. Thirdly, 
the works council is required to keep minutes of its deliberations49 a situation which is 
inconceivable where the works council is merely acting as a mediator.
A serious weakness of the negotiation process is that there is no legislative basis for 
employees proposed for retrenchment to demand full financial disclosure by the employer. 
This was clearly illustrated in Continental Fashions v Mupfururi 1997 (2) ZLR 405 (S) where 
employees relied on section 76 of the Labour Relations Act to demand full financial 
disclosure. This was rejected by the Supreme Court on the basis that section 76 only applied 
to collective bargaining agreements and not retrenchment.
3. If an agreement is "secured", the authority shall send a written approval to the employer 
concerned.50 A copy of the approval is required to be sent to the retrenchment committee.51 
Clearly, the sending of the copy of the approval to the retrenchment committee is merely 
for record purposes: the committee has no powers whatsoever, to interfere with the 
agreement even where it might appear to the committee that the retrenchment terms are 
unfair to one of the parties. An important point to note is that the regulations impose a 
time-limit within which the agreement should be secured. This should be within one month52 
and the works council has no jurisdiction to approve a retrenchment where an agreement 
for it has been secured outside the one month period. However, this does not mean that 
such an agreement is entirely useless: it may be taken into account by the retrenchment 
committee at the next stage of the process.
4. If no agreement is secured within one month of the serving of notice to the authority, the 
matter is referred to the retrenchment committee.53 This committee is established in terms
49. See section 3(3) of the Regulations.
50. Section 3(5)(a).
51. Section 3(5)(b).
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of section 4 of the regulations and has a tripartite composition: four government 
representatives, two worker representatives and two employers. The function of the 
committee is to consider the proposed retrenchment and recommend to the Minister of 
Labour whether or not the retrenchment should be approved. Although section 5(2) provides 
that the "retrenchment committee may in its discretion invite and receive representations, 
whether oral or written, from any interested parties", it is submitted that this does not oust 
the general principles of natural justice, particularly the audialteram partem rule. Accordingly, 
the parties to the retrenchment dispute have a right to be heard. This is more so when 
regard is had to the fact that the committee is statutorily obliged to consider a variety of 
factors specified in section 7, almost all of which cannot be satisfactorily considered without 
hearing the parties. The committee is required to make its recommendations within two 
weeks,54 failing which the Minister is obliged to make his/her decision as if the committee 
had made a recommendation.55 If the retrenchment committee fails to act within the 
stipulated time and the Minister has not intervened to act in terms of Section 5(3) of the 
Regulations, an interested party is entitled to apply to the High Court for an order directing 
the Minister to Act.56
5. The recommendations of the retrenchment committee are made to the Minister, who in 
terms of section 6(1) is required not only to consider them but also to have regard to the 
factors in section 7 and then make a decision either approving or refusing the proposed 
retrenchment. As already noted, the Minister is also required to act in terms of the same 
section where the retrenchment committee has failed to make its recommendations within 
the two-week period specified in the regulations. A question which may arise is: are the 
parties entitled to be heard by the Minister? The answer depends on the view one takes of 
the entire scheme of the regulations. It is submitted that given the composition of the 
retrenchment committee, the Minister is, in general, expected to accept its recommendations 
and only rejecting or changing them where there is an obvious misdirection. This should 
be so because the tripartite nature of the retrenchment committee places it in a better position 
than the Minister to weigh the factors specified in section 7. Given this role for the Minister, 
it is not necessary where he or she is considering the recommendations of the retrenchment 
committee, to give a hearing to the parties. A hearing before the Minister, apart from being 
impracticable, also renders the retrenchment committee redundant, a result which could 
never have been intended. The position should be different where the Minister is acting 
without the benefit of the recommendations of the retrenchment committee in terms of 
section 5(3). In such a case, the parties must be given an opportunity to be heard, but the 
circumstances of impracticability of organising oral hearings before the Minister suggest 
that an oral hearing is not required. It suffices for the Minister to consider written 
submissions from the parties.
In Kadir & Sons (Pvt) Ltd v Panganai57 the Supreme Court held that the Minister has no 
powers to approve a retrenchment retrospectively. In that case, the Minister, in approving 
retrenchment, had purported to backdate it. This is what the Supreme Court held to be
54. Section 5(1).
55. Section 5(2).
56. See Suns Manufacturers v Retrenched Employees SC120/99.
57. 1996 (1) ZLR 598 (S);
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unlawful. Gubbay CJ focussed on the use of the word "proposed" in sections 5,6 and 7 of 
the Regulations and noted:
It is clear to me that until the critical stage of the Minister's decision has been reached, 
the employees whom the employer proposes to retrench remain on the payroll. They 
have not been retrenched. . . .  To backdate the retrenchment conflicts with the 
intendment of the Regulations. A contrary view would cause an injustice to employees 
who, awaiting the Minister's decision on whether or not they were to be retrenched, 
are obliged not to seek and obtain other employment.58
The Minister has power to order that his/her approval of the retrenchment be effective 
from a date in the future.59
Initially there was no right of appeal against the Minister's decision because this was not 
provided for in the Act and the Regulations. This was changed in 1994 and the position 
now is that any party may appeal against the Minister's decision to the Labour Relations 
Tribunal.60 The regulations are silent on the effect of an appeal from the Minister's decision 
but the Supreme Court has held that the noting of an appeal against the Minister's decision, 
suspends the decision appealed against.61 In Phiri & Ors v Industrial Steel and Pipe62 the 
Minister had approved retrenchment, subject to a number of conditions which included a 
retrenchment package of: (i) six months severance pay and (ii) two weeks pay for every 
completed year of service.
The employer appealed against this decision to the Labour Relations Tribunal. Pending 
the hearing of the appeal, the workers instituted proceedings in the High Court contending 
that the noting of the appeal had the effect of suspending the Minister's determination and 
they were therefore still employed and entitled to their salaries and benefits until the appeal 
had been determined by the Labour Relations Tribunal.
Although the Supreme Court agreed that the effect of an appeal is to suspend the decision 
appealed against, the workers failed in their argument because the appeal was not against 
the Minister's approval of retrenchment but related only to the retrenchment package. As 
the retrenchment itself had not been appealed against, it stood and therefore their 
employment had been terminated. The position of the law is therefore clear, namely that 
where an appeal is noted against the decision to retrench, workers remain on the payroll 
and as long as they tender their services, the employer is obliged to pay them their salaries 
and benefits until the appeal is determined.
6. Once an agreement between the parties has been secured or approval has been granted, 
as the case may be, the employees to be retrenched are entitled to be given not less than 
one month's written notice of the retrenchment.63 It must be emphasized that this notice 
only takes effect either after the Minister's decision or after the securing of the agreement 
between the parties.64
58. See p. 604.
59. See Kadir & Sons v Panganai & Anor 1996 (1) ZLR 598 (s).
60. See section 6(2) of Retrenchment Regulations as amended by SI 137/94.
61. See Phiri & Ors v Industrial Steel and Pipe (Pvt) Ltd 1996 (1) ZLR 45 (S).
62. Ibid.
63. See sections 8A and 9(1) of the Regulations,
64. See Kadir & Sons v Panganai & Anor 1996 (1) ZLR 598 (s).
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It must be evident from the above description of retrenchment procedures that a distinctive 
feature of Zimbabwean law is that the final decision as to whether or not to retrench is not 
made by the employer. Either the employer secures an agreement with the employees 
concerned or the Minister makes the final decision. In most countries, the employer has 
the final decision and this is supported by international labour standards as recorded by 
ILO Convention 158.65 In South Africa, the legislation requires an exhaustive consultation 
process but the employer ultimately makes the decision whether or not to retrench.66 The 
Zimbabwean approach provides a better protection to workers by undercutting the 
managerial prerogative while the employer's interests are safeguarded by the right of appeal 
to the Labour Relations Tribunal or the review procedure in the High Court.
RETRENCHMENT PACKAGES
One of the most striking deficiencies of retrenchment law in Zimbabwe is that the legislation 
does not set out any minimum or recommended retrenchment packages. It must be noted 
that in the absence of legislative provisions, an employer has no duty to pay any 
retrenchment package at all. In the South African case of Young & Others v Lifegro Assurance 
Ltd67 it was said:
Severance pay, although a common and desirable feature of modern retrenchment 
practice in South Africa, is, in the absence of legislation or embodiment in the contract 
of employment, the outcome of collective or individual bargaining, not legal rights.68
The furthest that Zimbabwean legislation goes is to require those involved in the 
retrenchment process (that is, an authority, retrenchment committee or the Minister) to 
have regard to "the terminal benefits" to which the proposed retrenchees will become 
entitled, before approving the retrenchment.69 The expression "terminal benefits" does not 
necessarily refer to a distinct retrenchment package separate from the benefits that would 
accrue to an employee on normal termination, such as pay in lieu of leave, gratuity and so 
on. In fact, on a narrow reading of the current legislation, a retrenched employee may get 
exactly the same exit packages as he / she would have got on normal termination of 
employment.
An example of a minimum retrenchment package is provided by Section 41(1) of the South 
African Basic Conditions of the Employment Act, 199770 which provides as follows:
An employer must pay an employee who is dismissed for reasons based on the 
employer's operational requirements severance pay equal to at least one week's 
remuneration for each completed year of continuous service with that employer . . .
65. See Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158). However, the Convention requires 
extensive consultations and that an impartial body be empowered to overturn the employer's decision 
in appropriate cases.
66. See Section 189 of the Labour Relations Act, 1996.
67. (1991) 12 ILJ 1256 (LAC).
68. At 1265F-I.
69. See section 7 of the Regulations.
70. Act No. 75 of 1997.
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Although the legislation does not provide for a minimum retrenchment package, it is 
submitted that it makes it mandatory for a retrenchment package to be paid. This is evident 
from section 3(2) of the Regulations which provides that the employer and the employees 
concerned must seek to agree on two aspects, namely (i) whether or not the employees, 
should be retrenched and (ii) if so, the terms and conditions on which they may be 
retrenched. The regulations further provide that where retrenchment is unavoidable the 
terms and conditions on which agreement is required should include "the benefits to be 
paid on retrenchment including redundancy or severance payments and relocation 
allowances".71 72If there is no agreement on benefits to be paid, the matter is referred to the 
Retrenchment Committee, and thereafter to the Minister, who is required to "approve the 
proposed retrenchment subject to such terms and conditions as he may consider necessary 
or desirable to impose" -71
In view of the fact that the Regulations require an agreement to be reached on a retrenchment 
package, the Minister cannot approve a retrenchment without prescribing a retrenchment 
package. This follows logically from the fact that he/she only enters the retrenchment 
scene when the parties have failed to reach an agreement on inter alia, retrenchment packages 
and his/her role is to impose a reasonable retrenchment package.
An employer who wishes to retrench is therefore obliged to pay a retrenchment package, 
the only issue being the quantum of that package. The Supreme Court in Continental Fashions 
(Pvt) Ltd v Mupfuriri & Ors73 purported to set out some guidelines. In that case, a company 
which was in serious financial problems and on the verge of liquidation, sought to retrench 
some of its employees to avoid liquidation. McNally JA held that the ability of the company 
to pay the retrenchment package was the ultimate criterion in determining the quantum of 
the package. The words of his Lordship were as follows;
Clearly therefore, although it is not stated in the Regulations, the ability of the company 
to pay the retrenchment package is the ultimate criterion -  the bottom line. If the 
company cannot pay what it is ordered to pay it must go into liquidation, which is 
what the retrenchment exercise was designed to avoid.74
This approach is misconceived. There can be no such thing as "the ultimate criterion" in 
the assessment of a retrenchment package, if one takes into account the rationale of 
retrenchment law. As already argued, the main rationale of retrenchment law is, or should 
be, to strike an appropriate balance between the competing interests of the employer and 
those of the employees to be retrenched. The ability of the employer to pay a proposed 
package is merely one of the factors to be taken into account in the assessment of the 
quantum of a retrenchment package. The other important factor is the mitigation of the 
adverse consequences falling on the employees to be retrenched.
The latter actually appears to be the more important factor. This is fortified by section 7 of 
the regulations which requires an authority, the retrenchment committee and the Minister, 
as the case may be, to pay "due regard" to the consideration that "the consequences of
71. See Section 3(2a)(b) of the Regulations, SI 404/90 as amended by SI 252/92.
72. Section 6(1) of the Regulations.
73. 1997 (2) ZLR 405 (S).
74. At p.407H-408A.
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retrenchment to employees should be mitigated so far as possible". This implies that the 
factor of "inability of the employer to pay" should play second fiddle to the need to ensure 
a reasonable package for the employees to be retrenched.
It is submitted that the other factor to be taken into account should be the prevailing practices 
in the industry concerned. A court or authority being called upon to make an assessment 
of a retrenchment package must impose a reasonable package, having ultimate regard to 
the factors mentioned above. The ultimate test is one of reasonableness.75 It has also been 
said that the retrenchment package should simply not be "unduly oppressive or 
discriminatory".76 The result of this approach is that even where retrenchment has been 
resorted to for purposes of avoiding liquidation, inability to pay cannot be a defence to an 
order to pay a "reasonable" package. The employer may have to borrow to pay a 
retrenchment package as long as that package is adjudged to be reasonable. A question 
which may be raised is; when is a package reasonable? The answer is that this is a matter of 
discretion for the court or authority making the assessment. In terms of general principles 
of law, an assessment would be regarded as unreasonable and therefore liable to be set 
aside on review, if it is such that no reasonable person, applying his/her mind to the facts, 
would have arrived at it.
There is, therefore, no basis for the suggestion by the Supreme Court in Continental Fashions 
that different criteria apply in the assessment of retrenchment packages depending on 
whether the retrenchment results out of the mechanization of operations or from loss of 
profitability. The nature of the retrenchment may only affect the relevant weight to be 
placed on the key factors of (i) ability of the employer to pay and (ii) the mitigation of the 
adverse consequences falling on employees to be retrenched. For instance, where the 
retrenchment emanates from mechanization, the ability of the employer to pay may be less 
important than the need to cushion the employees concerned from the adverse consequences 
of retrenchment. This may translate into a high retrenchment package. On the other hand, 
where the retrenchment emanates from loss of profitability, the inability of the employer to 
pay may be more significant than the other factor and this may translate into a low 
retrenchment package. Each case depends on its own facts.
It is difficult to tell from the legislative provisions what are the main objectives of the 
retrenchment package. It has been said of severance allowances in general:
There has been much discussion about the nature of severance allowances. Are they 
an element of wages, payment of which has been postponed? Or are they the worker's 
'share' in the understanding, increasing with his length of service? Or a valuation of 
his job property rights? Or simply a means of income protection during a period of 
unemployment, helping him to adjust and move to new employment.77
It appears that the aspects mentioned in this passage are not mutually exclusive. In the 
case of Zimbabwe, the legislation, in seeking to minimize the consequ.ences of retrenchment
75. See Chinyerere & Others v The Cotton Company of Zimbabwe SC 113/99.
76. Ibid.
77. See B. Hepple, "Flexibility and Security of Employment" in R. Blanpain and C. Engels, Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Industrilised Market Economies (1998, Kluwer International) p.277. 
at 286.
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can be said to accommodate both income protection for the retrenched employee while at 
the same time realizing his/her value in the undertaking.
The absence of a legislative criterion for assessing retrenchment packages was severely 
criticized by McNally JA in Continental Fashions where he called upon the state to "make 
up its mind as to the extent to which it wishes to interfere with the operation of free market
forces".78
In Chidziva & Ors v ZISCO,79 the Supreme Court introduced the concept of waiver as follows: 
notwithstanding the fact that the retrenchment regulations have not been followed, 
employees who accept retrenchment packages may be taken to have waived the right to 
object to the procedural irregularities. In other words, a retrenchment will be regarded as 
valid even where the provisions of the regulations have not been complied with, if the 
employees accept their retrenchment packages in circumstances where such acceptance 
amounts to a waiver.
The use of the concept of waiver in this context is problematic. Waiver requires full 
knowledge of the legal rights being abandoned. Most workers involved in retrenchment 
disputes would not take the acceptance of a retrenchment package as an abandonment of 
any rights they may have to challenge the retrenchment. The views expressed in the minority 
judgment of Muchechetere JA in Chidziva are worth reproducing:
In considering this question of waiver sight must not be lost of the fact that the 
retrenchment packages were presented to the appellants as a fait accompli to persons 
who were not financially able to pass up the respondent's offer. And as submitted by 
Mr Morris given the high cost of litigation, the real difficulties experienced in finding 
alternative employment, the fact that the appellant are laymen unversed in the 
provision of the law of contract, it was not unreasonable for the appellants to take 
retrenchment packages.80
MEASURES TO PREVENT, OR MINIMISE EFFECTS OF RETRENCHMENT
An important aspect of retrenchment law in Zimbabwe is the emphasis given to either 
preventing retrenchment altogether or minimizing its effects. First, an authority to whom 
a retrenchment notice has been served is required to attempt to secure agreement between 
parties on avoiding retrenchment.81 The legislation, without being exhaustive, suggests 
various ways in which retrenchment may be avoided and these include restricting overtime, 
transferring employees between departments or enterprises, job-sharing, reduction of 
working hours, rotational unpaid leave and voluntary retirement.82 If the parties agree on 
these measures, retrenchment is avoided. If there is no agreement on the measures, and 
the workers are strongly of the view that retrenchment is avoidable, a dispute may be 
declared and referred to the Minister via the Retrenchment Committee.83 The Minister has
4
78. At p.411G.
79. 1997(2) ZLR 368(S).
80. At p.380C.
81. See Section 3(2a) of the Regulations.
82. Ibid.
83. See section 3(6) of the Regulations.
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the power to refuse to approve a proposed retrenchment if he/she is satisfied that it is 
avoidable.84 Secondly, the legislation permits an employer, with the agreement of the 
employees concerned or with a workers committee representing them, to have recourse to 
a number of measures that may avoid retrenchment.85 These measures include placing 
employees on short-time, instituting a system of shifts and reducing or deferring payment 
of remuneration of the employees concerned.86 However, such measures can only be 
implemented for a maximum period of twelve months.87 It is important to note that any 
agreement entered into for purposes of implementing measures to avoid retrenchment 
overrides any collective bargaining agreement to the contrary.88 This shows the legislative 
policy of attempting, as far as possible, to avoid retrenchment.
There is a potential room for abuse in any system which permits an employer to resort to 
measures of the sort outlined above to avoid retrenchment. For instance, an employer may 
resort to the measures as a cost cutting measure while pretending that it is seeking to avoid 
retrenchment. Retrenchment legislation seeks to minimize this abuse in two ways. The 
first is that the employees concerned must agree to the measures and secondly, the employer 
must serve a 14-day notice on the Retrenchment Committee, giving reasons supported by 
evidence as to why the measure is necessary.89 The Retrenchment Committee is empowered 
either to prohibit the employer from resorting to the measure or to order the suspension of 
the measure pending the provision of further reasons for resorting to measures.90 Thirdly, 
every employer is obliged to inform its employees of any major changes that are likely to 
entail the retrenchment of any of its employees. This is stated in section 8 of the Regulations 
in the following words:
Every employer shall ensure that, at the earliest possible opportunity, his employees 
are kept informed of, and consulted in regard to, any major changes in production, 
programmes, organizations or technology that are likely to entail the retrenchment of 
any of his employees.
This duty on the employer is designed to keep employees in the picture about the state of 
the employer so that retrenchment does not come as a surprise. In that way, it is a provision 
aimed at lessening the effects of retrenchment by making employees generally prepared 
for this eventuality, should it occur. However, its effectiveness is a matter of doubt. The 
legislation does not provide remedies for breach of this duty nor does it make clear the 
scope of consultation envisaged. It is submitted that where this duty has been breached, 
employees may use that fact as a basis for resisting a proposed retrenchment, the argument 
being that the employer has not given the employees sufficient warning of the pending 
retrenchment. In other words, the employees may use that fact to refuse to agree, in which 
case, the dispute will have to reach the Minister, who should use the same fact to decline to 
approve the proposed retrenchment.
84. See section 6, as read with Section 5 of the Regulations.
85. See Section 8 B(l) of the Regulations.
86. 7bid.
87. Ibid.
88. See Section 8B(2) of the Regulations.
89. See Section 8B(6).
90. See Section 8B(7) of the Regulations.
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What is consultation? Although the regulations do not say what it entails, it is suggested 
that it must be bona fide, must seek to achieve consensus between the employer and the 
employees and must afford the employees a fair and reasonable opportunity to express 
their views and proffer suggestions.91 While it is clear that consultation does not require 
the reaching of an agreement, it would appear that it entails the provision of relevant 
information by the employer.92 The employer may be held to have complied with the duty 
to consult if actual consultations fail because of unreasonable preconditions set by the 
employees.93
Fourthly, in cases where retrenchment is unavoidable, the workers are entitled to insist on 
the phasing of retrenchments over a period and on an equitable criteria for selecting 
employees to be retrenched.94 The Supreme Court has said that the criteria used to choose 
employees for retrenchment should be fair and reasonable.95 It indicated, obiter, that the 
principle of "last in, fist out" (LIFO) would be a suitable starting point.96 This is not stated 
in the Regulations and therefore, in principle, parties are entitled to agree on any criterion 
which, in the circumstances of the situation, is fair and reasonable. However, the LIFO 
principle is generally accepted in other countries as fair and reasonable.97
CONCLUSION
This article dem onstrates that the Zimbabwean law on retrenchment is largely a 
continuation of the post-independence efforts at job protection/security for workers, that 
gives it some strong worker protection features. However, it suffers from some fundamental 
defects arising mainly from an unclear policy articulation in labour law. For instance, the 
absence of a minimum retrenchment package is inconsistent with the strict regime which 
requires every retrenchment to be approved by a body other than the employer. On the 
other hand, the courts have been able to use the loopholes in the legislation to make 
substantial inputs of their own which may contradict the original legislative intentions.
91. See Hadebe & Others v Rometex Industriex Ltd (1986) 7 ILT 726 (lc); Atlantis Diesel Engines (Pty) Ltd v 
National Union of Mine Workers of SA (1994) 14 ILJ 1247 (A).
92. See NUMSA & Othei s v Comark Holdings Limited (1997) 5 BLLR 589 (LC).
93. See NEHAWU v University of Fort Hare (1997) 8 BLLR 1054 (LC) where the South African Labour 
Court refused to interdict a retrenchment, then the union declined consultation on the basis that it 
wanted the issue of the chairing of the consultation meetings to be resolved before the process could 
begin.
94. See section 3(2a)(b).
95. See Chidziva & Ors v ZISCO 1997(2) ZLR 368 (S).
96. Ibid.
97. See J. Grogan, Workplace Law 3rd edition (1998)p.l69.
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